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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The names of all parties to the proceeding in the lower court are set 
forth in the caption of the case on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by Judge Leslie A. Lewis in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
on Janua ry 24, 1994. That judgment incorporated the court's memorandum 
decision entered September 22, 1993, which granted the appellee's (hereinafter 
referred to as "Dalton") request for additur. That judgment also sets forth the 
court's ruling regarding an award of costs to Dalton. The court's judgment is 
appealed as of right pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Did the lower court err in granting Dalton's motion for 
additur on the grounds that the jury made findings clearly against the 
evidence and the verdict was outside the limits of any reasonable appraisal of 
damages as shown by the evidence? 
Standard: The court is "obliged to survey the evidence" and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's 
finding. Bodon v. Suhrmanix 327 P.2d 826, 829 (Utah 1958); Pratt v. Prodata, 
Inc., 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 
(Utah 1993); State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah 1992). 
A reviewing court will defer to a jury's damage award unless the award 
indicated that the jury disregarded competent evidence, or that the award is 
so excessive or inadequate beyond rational justification as to indicate the 
effect of improper factors in the determination, or that it clearly appears that 
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the award was rendered under a misunderstanding. Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Construction Company, 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985). 
Issue: Did the lower court appropriately award Dalton costs in 
light of the appellant's (hereinafter referred to as "Herold") offer of judgment 
and the appropriate statutes and case law on the issue of taxable costs? 
Standard: The trial court's award of costs is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah 
1980); Lloyds Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEDURES 
AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
On June 11, 1992, Dalton filed a complaint against Herold, asserting that 
on "October 15, 1990, [Dalton] was riding his motorcycle northbound on 900 
West in Salt Lake City, Utah. [Herold] carelessly and recklessly made a left-
hand turn in front of [Dalton] from the southbound traffic lane causing a 
collision." (R. 2-5) Dalton claimed that he suffered certain personal injuries 
with associated past and future medical expenses. On May 5, 1993, and 
pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Herold filed an 
offer of judgment in the amount of $15,000. (R. 62-64) That offer was rejected 
by Dalton and this matter was tried to a jury on May 17 through 19, 1993. 
Shortly after the automobile/motorcycle accident in question, Dalton 
was incarcerated. Later, Dalton entered a plea of guilty to the third degree 
felony of burglary. Prior to trial, the parties agreed that Dalton would not 
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make any claims for lost wages or any reference to how his physical 
limitations relate to employment in exchange for Herold not attempting to 
introduce evidence regarding Dalton's incarceration or criminal record. (R.373) 
Accordingly, the jury did not address any issues of whether Dalton could 
afford to obtain proper medical care or, in fact, receive free medical care while 
in jail. 
After the conclusion of the evidence at trial, the court directed the jury 
to find that Herold was negligent. The remaining issues were submitted to the 
jury on a special verdict form to answer special interrogatories. The jury 
found Dalton to have been negligent and both parties' negligence to be a 
proximate cause of Dalton's injuries. The jury concluded that Dalton was 20% 
at fault and that Herold was 80% at fault. Finally, the jury awarded special 
damages in the amount of $3,000 and general damages in the amount of 
$5,000. (R. 292) 
On May 27, 1993, Dalton filed his verified memorandum of costs and 
disbursements and a motion for additur and/or new trial with a supporting 
memorandum. (R. 358, 377) Dalton's memorandum and motion were opposed 
by Herold. (R. 387, 394) On August 10, 1993, the court heard argument 
regarding those issues. On September 27, 1993, the court issued a 
memorandum decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "AM. (R. 
433) On January 24, 1994, the court entered its final judgment and order 
regarding plaintiffs post-trial motion for verified costs and expenses, copies of 
which are attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C". (R. 452, 455) 
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The trial court found the amount of the jury's verdict to be "clearly 
inadequate in light of the evidence presented at the trial" and "not consistent 
with any actual special damages." Dal ton's motion for additur was granted 
and the court increased the award of special damages from the jury's verdict 
of $3,000.00 to a total of $22,910.24. The court did not alter the jury's verdict 
which found Dalton 20% at fault for his own injuries or the award of 
$5,000.00 in general damages. 
The trial court awarded Dalton $3,124.40 in costs, expenses and interest. 
Herold contended that because of the plaintiffs rejection of the offer of 
judgment no award of costs should be granted to Dalton or, in the alternative, 
that such an award should not include travel expenses incurred for the taking 
of the depositions of Dalton and Herold of $573.00, the court reporter fee for 
the deposition of Newell Knight of $188.90 (Knight was not called as a witness 
at trial), or the witness fees paid to Knight and Dr. Stadler of $525.00. It was 
further contested that the service fees were inflated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 15, 1990, immediately prior to the accident, Herold 
was the second car stopped at a red light at the intersection of 900 West and 
North Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 611) 
2. Herold was facing south and intending to make a left-hand turn. 
(R. 612) 
3. At the time of the accident, the traffic signals at the intersection 
in question did not provide a left-hand turn arrow. 
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4. Dalton was northbound on his motorcycle on 900 West. (R. 640) 
5. Dalton was not wearing a protective helmet. (Dalton has never 
worn a helmet while riding his motorcycle.) (R. 684) 
6. As soon as the light turned green, Herold followed the vehicle in 
front of him in making a left-hand turn. (R. 680) 
7. While approaching the intersection, Dalton had actually seen the 
green light for approximately four to six seconds before he passed the 
beginning of the left-hand turn lane for northbound traffic. (R. 677-678) 
8. Dalton had a clear view of Herold and the car ahead of Herold. 
(R 680) 
9. In attempting to stop, Dalton claimed to have locked up his 
brakes, yet no skid marks were left by his motorcycle. (R. 680-681) 
10. Dalton hit the very end of the Herold vehicle on its right rear 
quarter panel. (R. 685) 
11. At the scene of the accident, Dalton refused medical aid. (R. 685-
686) 
12. Later on the day of the accident, Dalton was treated at the 
emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital and released on the same day. 
(October 15, 1990). 
13. While at the emergency room, Dalton did not wish to have a 
plastic surgeon consulted. (R. 240, p. 2 of Holy Cross emergency department 
report) 
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14. Dalton was next examined by Dr. J ames Morgan, an orthopedic 
surgeon, almost two months later on December 6, 1990. (R. 748-749) 
15. Dr. Morgan saw Dalton only one other time on January 24, 1991; 
by that time Dalton's knee injury had returned to about pre-injury level, 
although he continued to have numbness of his face, right arm and hand. (R. 
756) 
16. Dalton saw Dr. Richard Hodnett, a plastic surgeon, on only one 
occasion on December 17, 1990, no treatment was rendered. (R. 766) 
17. Dr. Hodnett asked Dalton to return; Dalton did not return. 
(R.784) 
18. It is the policy of Dr. Hodnett's office to "call and ask the patient 
to come in for a repeat exam." (R. 785) 
19. In December of 1990, Dr. Hodnett "thought that, at that late of 
date, [Dalton] may need more extensive treatment than he would have needed 
if [Dr. Hodnett had] seen him within the first couple weeks of when [the 
accident] happened." (R. 769) 
20. When asked at trial whether Dalton needed surgery approximately 
two and one-half years after Dr. Hodnett last saw Dalton and had x-rays 
taken, Dr. Hodnett stated: "It's difficult, since I haven't been able to examine 
Mr. Dalton". (R. 781) 
21. Dalton received no treatment from any of the physicians who 
examined him (Dr. Morgan, Dr. Hodnett, Dr. Cosby, Dr. Mikesell, and Dr. 
Stadler) for his alleged injuries related to the accident in question. (R. 696) 
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22. Dalton did not follow his doctors' recommendations which would 
have mitigated his damages. (R. 702) 
23. When Dalton saw Dr. Michael P. Cosby on December 16, 1991 for 
his temporal mandibular joint concerns, Dalton had one tooth actually rotted 
down to the roots. (R. 827-28) 
24. When Dalton saw Dr. L. Vaun Mikesell, his second expert in the 
area of oral and maxillofacial surgery, shortly before trial on February 23, 
1993, Dalton had eight teeth that had severe cavities and may need to be 
extracted. (R. 858) 
25. In a letter to Dalton's attorney dated December 26, 1991, Dr. 
Cosby recommended that Dalton have his teeth cleaned. (R. 849) 
26. Dalton did not follow the recommendation to have his teeth 
cleaned. (R. 702) 
27. Dr. Cosby recommended that Dalton exercise appropriate dental 
hygiene. (R. 849) 
28. Dalton "just turned lazy" and did not exercise appropriate dental 
hygiene. (R. 702) 
29. Dr. Cosby recommended the removal of non-restored teeth and the 
restoration of restorable teeth. (R. 849) 
30. Dalton did not obtain appropriate dental care. (R. 702) 
31. Dr. Cosby recommended that Dalton be evaluated for splint 
therapy. (R. 849) 
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32. Dalton did not follow through in being evaluated for splint 
therapy. (R 702) 
33. It was Dr. Cosby's "feeling conservative treatment would be all 
that would be needed. Most likely, splint therapy would alleviate most of the 
myalgia and symptoms of TMJ dysfunction which [Dalton] is experiencing." (A 
copy of Dr. Cosby's letter is attached as Exhibit "D".) 
34. Dr. Mikesell testified that splint therapy would cost "around $300 
to $400." (R. 834) 
35. Dalton did not obtain splint therapy when recommended by Dr. 
Cosby and his TMJ condition became worse. (R. 838) 
36. When Dalton was examined by Dr. Cosby, Dalton's mouth opening 
was in the range of normal. (R. 845) 
37. When Dalton was examined by Dr. Cosby, there was no clicking or 
popping of the jaw to palpation. (R. 846) 
38. It did not appear from Dr. Mikesell's examination that Dalton 
followed any of the recommendations set forth by Dr. Cosby. (R. 850) 
39. Even at the time of trial, Dr. Mikesell would begin treatment 
conservatively and only if the patient does not respond would surgery be 
considered. (R. 850) 
40. Dr. Cosby's bill to Dalton's at torney was $65.00 for the 
examination and $200 for the report sent to Dalton's attorney; the report is an 
expense of litigation, not a medical bill. (R. 240, Dr. Cosby's itemization of 
charges and payments.) 
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41. Dalton's past medical expenses equal $2,703.24, which represents 
II $2,903.24 figure presented by Dalton at trial, less $200 for Dr. Cosby's 
report to Dalton's attorney. 
12 If one were to add $300.00 for conservative splint therapy 
treati ii re special damages to the past medical special damages, the 
total special damage figure would be within $3.24 of the jury's special damagi 
award of $3,000.00. 
rhe plaintiff was examined by Dr. E. Warren Stadler, an expert in 
the area of physical rehabilitation, on February 22, 1993. (R. 864) 
44. At the time of Dr. Stadler's examination, Dalton had a full range 
the cervical spine without weakness in the upper extremity or the 
neck area. (R. 869) 
45. Dr. Stadler's examination found decreased sensation in Dalton's 
right index finger and on the right facial area around the right eye. (R. 869, 
872) 
46. Dalton's loss of sensation is caused by a nerve problem. (R. 873) 
4r , Stadler's examination found Dalton's facial fractures to be 
well healed. (R. 872) 
48. Dr. Stadler did not place any limitation on Dalton's activities of 
daily living. (R. 873) 
49. Dr. Stadler did not feel that surgical intervention on Dalton 
would be helpful with regard to his knee, his neck, his shoulder, his arm or 
with regard to his facial injuries. (R. 872-872) 
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50. Surgery would not be helpful in reestablishing the sensory 
patterns for nerve problems experienced by Dalton. (R. 873) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury's award of damages was consistent with the testimony of the 
witnesses at trial. The medical expenses established were $2,703.24, plus the 
cost of conservative treatment which was estimated at $300.00. The jury 
awarded a total of $3,000.00. There was a reasonable basis for this award. 
Sufficient evidence was produced that the jury could correctly decide 
that Dalton had failed to mitigate his damages. He had not received any 
medical t reatment and had not followed through with any of his doctors' 
recommendations. 
The jury was presented with credible evidence at trial rebutting Dalton's 
allegations that future surgeries would be required. The jury had sufficient 
evidence to decide that future surgeries would not be required . The court 
finding that $20,007.00 for future medical expenses had been undisputed was 
in error. 
Dalton was extended a reasonable offer of judgment prior to trial. The 
jury's award was less than that offer. Accordingly, Dalton should not be 
awarded costs. In the alternative, the cost award should be modified in 
accordance with statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
BECAUSE THE DAMAGES AWARDED DALTON BY THE JURY WERE NOT SO 
INADEQUATE AS TO INDICATE A DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE BY THE 
JURY, THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT EMPOWERED TO GRANT A MOTION FOR 
ADDITUR. 
After the jury awarded Dalton $3,000 for special damages ai.u ^ 
general damages as a result of the automobile/motorcycle accident 
question, Dalton moved the court for additur or new trial pursuant to Rule 
59(a)(5), (6) and (7). Dalton maintains that the damages were inadequate and 
appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, that 
the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, and that the verdict was 
against the law or an error in the law. The trial court was persuaded that 
jury verdict was "inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial" and 
granted "the motion for additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special 
damages." (Memorandum Decision dated September 22, 1993, P. 1 I The trial 
court further stated: 
The award for special damages mus t bear a reasonable 
relationship to the evidence. This court finds that the 
award of $3,000 does not bear this reasonable relationship 
to the evidence adduced at trial. The plaintiff presented 
evidence that his pas t medical bills were $2,903.24 (See 
Exhibit "3"); and an award of $3,000, while close to this 
amount, it is greater than the actual past medical expenses, 
and not consistent with any actual special damages. An 
additur is therefore granted. 
{Id. at p.3.) 
Dalton's exhibit summarizing his medical bills indicated: $ l ,23 r 
examination, x-rays, CT scans and stitches at Holy Cross Hospital on the day 
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of the accident, October 15, 1990; $328.47 for x-rays and CT scans by Valley 
Radiologists also on the day of the accident, October 15, 1990; (Over one-half 
of the plaintiffs actual past special damages were incurred on the day of the 
accident . $ l , 5 6 1 . 2 4 / $ 2 , 7 0 3 . 2 4 . ) ; $115.00 for extended consultat ion, 
examination and x-rays by Dr. Richard Hodnett on December 5, 1990; $192.00 
for consultation and examination by Dr. William Bentley on May 16, 1991; 
$540.00 for EMG study by Dr. Karl Gross on May 20, 1991; $95.00 for 
consultation, examination and x-rays by Dr. Marc Schwartz on June 25, 1991; 
$265.00 for TMJ consultation and report by Dr. Michael Cosby on December 
16, 1991; and $135.00 for TMJ exam and x-ray by Dr. L. Vaun Mikesell on 
February 23, 1993. (R. 240, medical bills and treatment summary for Dalton.) 
It was pointed out to the jury that Dr. Cosby's bill dated May 12, 1993 
for services performed on December 16, 1991, was for a TMJ consultation fee of 
$65.00 and a narrative report or Dr. Cosby's letter to Dalton's attorney of 
$200.00. (R. 1001). The letter to Dalton's attorney is a cost of litigation and 
should be subtracted from the plaintiffs total medical expenses of $2,903.24, 
leaving the actual total of the plaintiffs past special damages at $2,703.24. 
This court must "view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to [the jury's] verdict." Pratt v. Prodata, 
Inc., 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994). There is no question that Dalton 
failed to follow through with his treating physicians. In fact, from the time of 
the accident to the time of trial, Dalton received no actual treatment from any 
medical provider. In that light, a jury could have reasonably inferred from Dr. 
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Stadler's testimony that Dalton would not have benefited at the time of trial 
In 11 II my surgical intervention with regard to Dalton's knee, neck, shoulder, 
arm and face. The jury could have also reasonably inferred from Di Ci osby's 
letter of December 26, 1991, to Dalton's attorney that splint therapy and 
"conservative treatment would be all that would be needed to resolve Dalton's 
TMJ symptoms." Conservative treatment, on the low end, would cost Daltoi1 
$300. 
"When the damages are not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of 
the evidence by the jury, a court is not empowt to entertain a mutii m li m 
additur." Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981). (Emphasis 
added ] the recent case of Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 
(Utah 1994), the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
We dispose of defendants' sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims 
by adhering to a well-established principle of appellate 
review: This court will upset a jury verdict 'only upon a 
showing that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor 
of the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on 
the outcome of the case.' [EA. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. 
v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 13201, 1322 (Utah 1983); 
accord Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 
(Utah 1984).] The burden on an appellant to establish that 
the evidence does not support the jury's verdict and the 
factual findings implicit in that verdict ... is quite heavy.' 
[Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 
1987).] To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant 
must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and 
then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is not 
sufficient to support it.' [Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 
769 (Utah 1985) (citing Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985)).] 
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There is no question that "the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict" support a finding 
of past special damages in the amount of $2,703.24, and future special 
damages in the amount of $300.00. Clearly, the jury's award of $3,000 for 
special damages bears "a reasonable relationship to the evidence." 
The damages awarded by the jury to Dalton are not so inadequate "as 
to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice or 
corruption on the part of the jury." McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 
62 Utah 115, 129, 218 P.98, 104 (1923); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1983). Accordingly, the jury's verdict, not the trial court's additur, should 
stand. 
n. 
THE JURY CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED THAT DALTON FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES 
The basis of the court's order that $19,910.24 should be added to the 
jury's award of $3,000 in special damages was that such an amount in medical 
care "more probably than not will be required and given in the future." (Jury 
Instruction No. 44. R. 343.) The court found the amount of $20,007 for future 
medical expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at trial. (R. 
435) Apparently, the court was also convinced that the care would be "given 
in the future." That medical expense figure represented the cost of two future 
surgeries. One of the surgeries was testified to by Dr. Hodnett and would be 
performed in an effort "to release either scar tissue or bony fragments from the 
nerve to attempt to recover some of the sensation" lost in Dalton's face. (R. 
14 
782) The second surgery was testified to by Dr. Mikesell and would be 
intended to assist Dalton with his TMJ symptoms. 
Ai the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed regarding cn^itil 
damages. Jury Instruction No. 44 states: 
IUU may award special damages, if proven, for the 
reasonable value of medical care, services and supplies 
reasonably required and actually given in treatment of the 
plaintiff and the reasonable value of similar items that more 
probably than not will be required and given in the future. 
(R 313) That instruction clearly directs the jury to award special damages for 
future medical treatment only if they are persuaded that DaltoiI 
and be given the treatment. Accordingly, Dalton's "track record" of ignoring 
1lis physicians' recommendations and failing to receive treatment is insightful, 
if not, critical. 
The law also requires a plaintiff to mitigate his damages. The jury was 
directed Jury Instruction No. 36 as follows: 
It is the duty of a person who has been injured to use 
reasonable diligence in caring for the injuries and 
reasonable means to prevent their aggravation and to 
accomplish healing. 
When an injured person does not use reasonable 
diligence to care for the injuries, and they are aggravated as 
a result of such failure, the liability, if any, of another whose 
act or omission was a proximate cause of the original injury, 
mus t be limited to the amount of damage that would have 
been suffered if the injured person had exercised the 
required diligence. 
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FACIAL INJURIES 
Dalton was not wearing a helmet at the time his motorcycle c< ilided 
with the rear-end of Herold's car. (R. 684) Dalton suffered facial injuries as a 
result of that accident. Immediately after the accident, Dalton refused medical 
aid. (R. 685) The police took Dalton to his home and later some friends took 
Dalton to Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 687) Dalton was at Holy Cross Hospital, 
on the day of the accident, for approximately two and one-half to three hours. 
(R. 688) Much of the time at the hospital was spent lying on a cot without 
being examined. (R. 689) At that time, Dalton "did not wish to have a plastic 
surgeon consulted." (R. 240; Holy Cross Emergency Room record dated 
10/15/90) 
Dalton was also examined by CT scans and x-rays at the hospital. 
Nothing other than diagnostic testing was performed. No treatment was 
received by Dalton. (R. 689) 
Dalton was next examined by Dr. Hodnett on December 17, 1990, over 
two months after the accident. (R. 766) The failure to receive care within the 
first couple of weeks of the accident may have caused Dalton's condition to 
worsen and may have lead to Dalton needing "more extensive treatment". (R. 
769) Dalton was only seen and diagnosed by Dr. Hodnett on that one 
occasion and no treatment was performed. After his only visit, Dalton was 
told by Dr. Hodnett to return. Dalton failed to do so. (R. 784) Dalton never 
saw Dr. Hodnett again. The jury was clearly instructed that if Dalton failed 
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to care for his injuries, Herold could not be liable for the fact that the injuries 
^rsened. 
When Dalton was examined shortly before trial on February ?:.?, (993, 
Dalton's facial fractures were well-healed. (R. 841, 872) The only deficit in the 
that "his sensation was decreased around the right facial area 
around the right eye when compared to the left." (R. 872) That pi oblen I \ i a s 
diagnosed by the only doctor, Dr. Stadler, to have examined Dalton's facial 
> months. 
Apparently, the jury did not award future damages for JXIIUMI'S (anal 
injuries. In viewing the evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict, the 
( \ i l i Iraih supports a finding that Dalton's fractures were well-healed at 
the time of trial and that his only deficit as a result of those fra< hues was a 
very minor one. In fact, Dr. Stadler testified that Dalton would experience no 
day-to-day limitation as a result of the decreased sensation around his right 
eye. 
To successfully attack the verdict, [the party attacking the 
verdict] must marshall all the evidence supporting the 
verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support it. 
Von 11ake v. Thomas at 769. It is impossible for Dalton to meet his burden as 
set forth above for the simple fact that the evidence in this case strongly 
supports the jury's verdict. 
I'M,i ^V 'MPiOMS 
When Dalton was examined in the emergency department at Holy Cross 
Hospital on the day of the accident on October 15, 1990, he denied "any neck 
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pain, or any other pain, except that he scraped his left knee which is 
significant for reconstructive surgery (although it does not feel painful at this 
time.)" (R. 240, Holy Cross Emergency Room record dated 10/15/90) On 
examination of his facial injuries at the emergency room, there was no palpc le 
bony fracture, although he was very tender over the zygomatic arch, and there 
was some soft tissue swelling and tenderness over the maxilla on the right 
side. His oral cavity was unremarkable. 
Dalton had a tender "TMJ" when examined by Dr. Hodnett on December 
17, 1990. Dalton was first seen, however, by an oral and maxillofacial 
surgeon, Dr. Michael P. Cosby, in Denver, Colorado one year later on December 
16, 1991. When Dalton saw Dr. Cosby, he "presented with a chief complaint of 
pain with chewing and popping of the jaws." His pain, which was experienced 
on a daily basis lasting 30 to 60 seconds, was on the right side only. In a 
letter to Dalton's attorney, Dr. Cosby diagnosed Dalton as having "internal 
derangement of the TMJ on the right," and recommended conservative splint 
therapy treatment. It was Dr. Cosby's "feeling conservative treatment would 
be all that would be needed" regarding Dalton's TMJ dysfunction. 
In anticipation of trial, Dalton's attorney arranged to have Dalton 
examined by another oral and maxillofacial surgeon, Dr. Vaun Mikesell, on 
February 22, 1993. A comparison of Dr. Cosby's and Dr. Mikesell's 
examinations shows Dalton's unwillingness to care for his own health and his 
continued iuilure to follow-through with his doctors' recommendations. It 
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was clear to the jury that Herold should not be liable for Dalton allowing his 
nattended. 
ihe time of Dr. Cosby's examination, Dalt 
opening within the range of normal of 44 millimeters. That opening was 
mllimeters with a strain and 25 millimeters without straining 
when he was seen by Dr. Mikesell. (R. 838, 845) Cosby found Daltoi 
have a normal occlusion on the right and an abnormal occlusion on the left. 
Mikesell ionn J an abnormal occlusiori oiI both sides and Dalton indicated 
to Dr. Mikesell that Dalton had had a recent change in his bite. 
Cosby noted a negative finding for clicking, popping or crepitus. \ positive 
I i i in in 1114 v 'us made by Dr. Mikesell. (R. 837) 
Dalton's personal dental hygiene was lacking to say the least I 
example, in December of 1991, Dalton had only one tooth that was decayed 
dowi ^ root such that it should be extracted. In February of 1993, 
Dalton had at least six teeth in such a condition. Dalton simply did not care 
about his own personal needs or following his doctors' orders. At trial on May 
17, 1993, Dalton testified in response to questioning by counsel for Herold, in 
part, as follows: 
Q: I see. When you were brought over [to Utah 
from Colorado] at my expense to see Dr. Stadler, did you not 
also take advantage of that time and see Dr. Mikesell for the 
first and only time? 
A : Yes, sir. 
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Q: Only time you ever saw Dr. Mikesell? 
A: That was the first time. 
Q: Did Dr. Mikesell treat you in any regard? 
A: No. He did a thorough exam. 
Q: So again, you had more diagnostic examination 
without treatment? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Have you received any of the treatment that Dr. 
Mikesell recommended on February 23, 1993? 
A: No, I haven't. 
Q: At that time, Dr. Mikesell recommended that you 
have all six or seven of these rotten teeth extracted. Have 
you had that done? 
A 
9 
A 
Q 
hygiene? 
A: 
9 
A 
No, I haven't. 
Have you had a teeth cleaning? 
No, I haven't. 
Have you been instructed on proper oral 
Yes, I have. 
Who instructed you? 
That would be back in Colorado with a Dr. 
Cosby. 
Q: So Dr. Cosby did, in fact, do the instructions? 
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Ai Yes, originally. 
Q: But you didn't follow those instructions, did 
you? 
A: For a while, sir. 
Q: How long? 
A: I would say about nine months. 
Q: And then you went back to pat terns of not 
ishing your teeth? 
A: Yes. Well, not the flossing part, and ti le 1 lea \ > 
part, I quit doing that. I still brush my teeth. 
Q: All right. So if Dr. Mikesell were to testify that 
it didn't appear from his examination that you followed 
with any good oral hygiene, would that surprise you? 
A: No, it wouldn't. 
Q: So you would agree that you did not change 
and have good oral hygiene after your meeting with Dr. 
Cosby? 
A: It started looking better, and then I jus t turned 
lazy on it. 
Q: Okay. So you didn't have the teeth extracted, 
didn't have a teeth cleaning. Did you have conservative 
treatment for the TMJ problem, the splint therapy? 
A: No, I didn't. 
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Q: I'm jus t checking what else he recommended. 
Did you have any of your teeth fixed, those in addition to 
the ones that had rotted down to the root, did you have 
fillings or anything placed in those? 
A: No, sir. 
(R. 700-702) 
There is no doubt that the evidence supports the jury's finding that 
Dalton failed to mitigate his damages with respect to his TMJ symptoms. In 
fact, Dr. Mikesell directly testified on that point in examination at trial by 
Dalton's attorney. 
Q: Now, if somebody has a damage to their TMJ 
joint, say on October 15th of 1990, if that is not treated, 
either by splint therapy or surgery, can the condition 
become worse? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you think that happened in this case? 
A: I believe it did, yes. 
(R 838) 
The failure to obtain appropriate t reatment and the subsequent 
worsening of conditions falls squarely on the shoulders of Dalton. In 
December of 1991, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, Dr. Cosby, opined that 
Dalton only needed conservative splint therapy treatment for the TMJ injuries 
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allegedly resulting from the accident in question. The cost of that treatment is 
between $300 and $400. (R. 834) Any future complications would have been 
avoided had Dalton simply followed through with the recommendations of his 
physician. 
m 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRAIL REBUTTING DALTON'S 
ALLEGATIONS THAT FUTURE SURGERIES WILL BE REQUIRED 
In justifying the need to award the plaintiff an additur, the court stated 
in its memorandum decision: 
This court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical 
expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at 
trial. During the trial, Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo 
Vaun Mikesell, expert witnesses called by the plaintiff, 
testified that the amount of future medical expenses, if 
surgery occurred (and they both perceived surgery as 
necessary) would be, at least, $20,007.00. Although the 
defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness, evidence 
of the cost of the plaintiffs special damages was not 
disputed. 
(R 435) 
The trial court, however, in its review of the evidence apparently ignored 
the contrary credible evidence testified to by Dr. Stadler and documented by 
Dr. Cosby that future surgeries would not be necessary. Because there was 
evidence that the surgeries were not necessary, the cost of those surgeries 
need not be disputed. 
FACIAL INJURIES 
Dr. Hodnett 's first and only examination of Dalton took place on 
December 17, 1990. The next physician to examine the plaintiffs facial injuries 
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was Dr. Stadler on February 22, 1993. Three months later at trial, Dr. Stadler 
testified regarding Dalton's facial injuries and the need for surgery regarding 
those injuries: 
Q: Now, with regard to [Dalton's] facial injuries, 
what was your examination of the facial injuries? 
A: It would have been palpation around the face, 
feeling of the face at the site of the injury. 
Q: Now, with that, do you have an opinion as to 
how well-healed this individual was with regard to the 
fractures he experienced in his face? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what was that opinion? 
A: I feel that the fractures would be well-healed. 
Q: Did you feel that there would be a need at the 
time for any type of surgical intervention with regard to the 
facial fractures? 
A: No, I would not. 
Q: Now, you did find -- please respond to whether 
you found any deficit in the face. 
A: I'm going to look back at the clinical 
examination. I felt that his sensation was decreased around 
the right facial area around the right eye when compared to 
the left. 
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Q: How would tha t place a limitation on this 
individual, if at all, on day-to-day living? 
A: On activities of daily living, I would not see any 
limitations. 
Q: What would be the cause of the loss of 
sensation? Is it a nerve problem, or what would that be? 
A: It would be a nerve problem. 
Q: Would surgery assist in correcting the nerve 
problem? 
Mr. Waddoups: Objection, foundation, your honor. 
The court: Sustained. 
Q: (By Mr. Dunn) Do you have an opinion as to 
whether surgery would assist in any regard, with regard to 
the nerve problem in the face? 
Mr. Waddoups: Objection, foundation. We don't 
know if this person's qualified to do surgery. 
The court: This question can be answered yes or no. 
Q: (By Mr. Dunn) Do you have an opinion as to 
whether surgery would be helpful? 
A: Surgery would not be helpful. 
Mr. Waddoups: Objection, that was a yes or no 
question. 
The court: Sustained. The answer will be stricken. 
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Q: (By Mr. Dunn) J u s t answer if you have an 
opinion as to whether it would be helpful or not. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Yes, you have an opinion. And what is that 
opinion based on? What background do you have to come 
to that opinion? 
A: Well, my background is physical medicine and 
rehabilitation. It deals with people that have had nerve 
injury, both spinal cord, peripheral nerve injuries, meaning, 
by peripheral, I mean nerves that are outside of the spinal 
cord. That would be facial nerves, that would be nerves, 
sensory nerves that are in the upper or lower extremities, or 
in the face. 
Q: So then I would like to ask that next question. 
Why, is it, then -- what is your opinion as to whether 
surgery would be helpful with regard to the nerve damage in 
the face? 
Mr. Waddoups: Objection, your honor. We still don't 
have foundation as to his qualifications as a surgeon. I 
would like to voir dire the witness as to that. 
The court: You may voir dire. 
Mr. Waddoups: Dr. Stadler, are you a surgeon? 
The witness: No, I am not a surgeon. 
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Mr. Waddoups: Do you perform surgery? 
The witness: No, I do not perform surgery. 
Mr. Waddoups: If surgery is indicated, you refer 
patients to a surgeon? 
The witness: That is correct. 
Mr. Waddoups: Your honor, I renew my objection. 
The court: I believe it goes to the weight, 
versus the admissibility. The objection is overruled, you 
may answer the question if you remember it, if not, counsel 
will put it to you again. 
Mr. Dunn: Thank you, your honor. 
Q: (By Mr. Dunn) What is your opinion as to 
whether surgery would be necessary or helpful in regard to 
the nerve injury in the face? 
A: My opinion is that surgery would not be helpful. 
Q: And why is that? 
A: Because there's been, number one, a length of 
time with regard to the injury, there are different types of 
nerve injuries, called a transsection of the nerve, there 
would also be a crushing injury of the nerve. The length of 
time in this case, I do not feel that surgery would be helpful 
in reestablishing the sensory pattern on this gentleman's 
face. 
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Q: What does regeneration of a nerve mean? 
A: Regeneration means the nerve grows back. 
Q: Can a nerve, after this length of time, from an 
accident back in 1990 of October to the present time, could 
the nerve regenerate? 
A: Medical probability at this time would speak 
against that. 
(R. 872-876) 
In Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
The award of damages may be less than the plaintiff wished 
or even less than we would have found had we been the 
jury; but it is the prerogative of the jury to make the 
determination of damages and we cannot subst i tute our 
judgment for tha t of the fact finder unless the evidence 
compels a finding that reasonable men and women would, of 
necessity, come to a different conclusion. 
The jury in this case was presented with evidence from a physician the court 
allowed to testify that Dalton's facial injuries would not benefit from surgical 
intervention. Accordingly, the courts should not substitute their judgment for 
that of the finder of fact and add to the special damages awarded by the jury. 
The evidence presented at trial does not support "a finding that reasonable 
men and women would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion." 
TMJ SYMPTOMS 
It is truly uncontroverted that Dalton's first oral and maxillofacial 
surgeon, Dr. Cosby, was of the opinion that Dalton's TMJ symptoms would be 
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corrected by conservative splint therapy. No one will ever know whether Dr. 
Cosby was correct because Dalton completely ignored Dr. Cosby's 
recommendat ions regarding his dental and TMJ care. Dr. Cosby's 
correspondence to Dalton's attorney, standing alone, directly rebuts Dalton's 
allegation that future surgery on his temporal mandibular joint will be 
required. 
Dr. Cosby's opinion is bolstered yet further by Dr. Mikesell's own 
testimony when questioned at trial regarding his own treatment plan for 
Dalton: 
Q: What was your treatment plan for Mr. Dalton? 
A: I would have probably started him out on a soft 
diet, heat, massage, and probably some medications, and an 
occlusal splint to see if that would help relieve the joint 
symptoms. 
(R. 833-834) ... 
Q: Now, would you please tell the jury what 
recommendations Dr. Cosby gave the plaintiff in December 
of 1991? 
A: He indicated that he should have his dentition, 
or his teeth restored to normal health, and that would 
involve a good cleaning, and instruction of oral hygiene, to 
remove non-restored teeth, and restoration of the restorable 
teeth. He also indicated he ought to have tomograms of the 
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TMJ's to asses for structural abnormalities, after which he 
should be evaluated for splint therapy. And he indicated at 
this point that conservative therapy would probably be all 
that was required. 
Q: Right. And that 's in the second paragraph he 
said, 'It is my feeling that conservative treatment will be all 
that will be needed.' Is that correct? 
A: That's what he indicated. 
Q: And conservative treatment is similar to what 
your t reatment plan was of soft diet, heat, and splint 
therapy? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the splint therapy would cost between $300 
and $400? 
A: In my office. 
Q: With regard to these recommendations, and 
when you examined the plaintiff, did he follow, from your 
examination, any of the recommendations set forth by Dr. 
Cosby? 
A: It did not appear that he had. 
Q: Now, with regard to surgery, he indicated that 
he, quote, may need surgery sometime in the future. Is that 
an accurate description of your testimony? 
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A: That is. 
Q: And isn't it true that you would not cross the 
bridge of surgery, so to speak, until after you have had an 
opportunity to treat this individual conservatively for three 
or four months? 
A: In my office we begin treatment conservatively, 
and if the patient does not respond, then we seek other 
methods of treatment, which would include surgery. 
Q: Right. But you do the conservative treatment 
and hope the patient will respond? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that will be enough, correct? 
A: Yes, we hope so. 
(R. 849-850) 
Again, no one will know whether Dalton would have responded to 
conservative treatment performed by Dr. Mikesell and whether the "bridge of 
surgery" would ever have to be crossed because Dalton did not follow Dr. 
Mikesell's recommendations. The jury was correct in determining that credible 
evidence was presented at trial rebutting Dalton's assertions that future 
surgeries would be necessary. 
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IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED COSTS IN 
EXCESS OF THOSE ALLOWED BY STATUTE 
Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Herold filed 
an offer of judgment in the amount of $15,000. That offer was rejected by 
Dalton. Rule 68(b) states: 
... If the judgment finally obtained by the offerree is not 
more favorable than the offer, the offerree must pay the costs 
incurred after the making of the offer. ... 
The jury awarded an amount less than the offer of judgment filed by Herold. 
Herold did not seek the payment of any costs but contended that Dalton also 
should not be awarded costs. 
Rule 68 is designed to encourage parties to make and accept reasonable 
settlement offers. It is obvious that the $15,000 offered by Herold was 
reasonable in light of the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs such as Dalton should not 
be awarded costs when they refuse to accept reasonable settlement offers. In 
the case at hand, liability was primarily against Herold. In such cases, the 
plaintiff will undoubtedly be the "prevailing party" and could be awarded 
costs. Public policy would argue that a plaintiff that does not accept a 
reasonable offer of judgment should not be awarded costs. In this case, 
neither of the parties should be awarded costs. 
Despite Herold's arguments, the trial court awarded Dalton $2,330.00 in 
costs. In the alternative of awarding no costs to Dalton, the following costs 
should not be awarded Dalton, or modified, under any circumstance: 
Travel expenses re: depositions of Herold and Dalton - $ 573.00 
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Court reporter fee for Newell Knight's deposition - $ 188.90 
Process server's fees, witness fees, and mileage -
Newell Knight (depo) $ 125.00 
Dr. Warren Stadler (depo) $ 400.00 
Dr. Warren Stadler (service) $ 43.00 
Dr. Vaun Mikesell (service) $ 37.00 
Dr. James Morgan (service) $ 35.00 
Dr. Richard Hodnett (service) $ 45.00 
Officer Mike Roberts (service) $ 30.00 
Total: $1,476.90 
(R. 453) 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 
773 (Utah 1980): "Costs were not recoverable at common law; and are 
therefore generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided 
by statute." Utah Code Annotated allows for a taxing of costs for serving a 
subpoena upon a witness. Section 21-2-4(1) and (4) of the Utah Code 
Annotated provides that the sheriff shall receive a fee of $6.00 for serving a 
subpoena and $1.00 for each mile necessarily traveled, in going only. Section 
21-5-4 allows the payment of witnesses $17.00 per day and "if traveling more 
than 50 miles, $1.00 for each four miles in excess of 50 miles actually and 
necessarily traveled in going only." 
Dalton was awarded as costs a minimum of $30.00 for the service of a 
subpoena for a witness to appear at trial. As such, the individual would have 
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to reside 24 miles from the courthouse for that amount to be justified. In 
addition, Dalton was awarded costs for service of subpoenas on Dalton's own 
expert witnesses. Those costs should be modified. 
Dalton was awarded $525.00 as costs for the witness fees associated 
with the taking of Herold's expert's depositions, Newell Knight and Dr. 
Stadler. The statutes only allow the payment of $17.00 as witness fees. 
Dalton's award of costs should be accordingly reduced. The remainder of the 
money paid by Dalton is an expense of litigation which is not properly taxable 
as costs. Id. at 774. 
Finally, Dalton was awarded as costs the expense of traveling to 
Portland to take the deposition of Herold and to Denver to defend the 
deposition of Dalton. Such travel expenses are not recoverable as costs. The 
court abused its discretion when it awarded those costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Although not all the evidence was favorable to Herold, clearly sufficient 
competent evidence existed to enable the jury to arrive at its verdict for 
damages and accordingly the jury's verdict should stand. Batty v. Mitchell 
575 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1978). Based on the foregoing, Herold urges this 
court to overturn the trial court's award of additur and reinstate the jury's 
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award of damages as the final judgment in this case, without an award of 
costs to any party. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 1994. 
DUNN & DUNN 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
KEVIN D. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 920903329 
vs. : 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Additur or New Trial. A hearing was held in this Court 
on August 10, 199 3, and argument was heard on the plaintiff's 
motion. The court denied the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and 
took the Motion for Additur under advisement. The Court having now 
carefully reviewed the relevant law, the memoranda submitted by 
counsel, and having considered counsels' arguments, rules as stated 
herein. The Court finds that the amount of the jury's verdict is 
inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial, and grants the 
Motion for Additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special 
damages. The jury's award of $5,000.00 for general damages is to 
remain at that amount. 
The Court in assessing the verdict has considered the same in 
the light most favorable to the jury's findings. Assessment, under 
DALTON V. HEROLD PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
this standard, leads the Court to conclude that the jury's award is 
clearly inadequate in light of the evidence presented at trial. 
The law is clear that although a trial judge may assess the 
evidence differently than a jury, mere disagreement is not a 
sufficient reason to order a new trial or an additur. The power of 
a trial judge to order a new trial or grant an additur is reserved 
for those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly contrary to 
the weight of the evidence. Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P. 2d 530 (Utah 
1984), and Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958). Bodon v. 
Suhrmann, makes it clear that if an award shows that the jury 
misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts, or 
misunderstood or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly 
against the evidence, and the verdict is outside the limits of any 
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it should 
not be permitted to stand. Although Bodon is a 1958 case, it 
remains the law in Utah. Bodon has been cited and reaffirmed in 
Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), and in Mever v. 
Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984). 
The Bodon case is important to review in relation to the 
instant case. In Bodon, the contention was that the verdict was 
outside the limits of what appeared justifiable under the evidence. 
The Court ruled, "In such instances the remedy is to order a 
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modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence." Jd 
at 828. 
This Court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical 
expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at trial. 
During the trial Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell, 
expert witnesses called by the plaintiff, testified that the amount 
of future medical expenses, if surgery occurred (and they both 
perceived surgery as necessary), would be, at least, $20,007.00. 
Although the defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness, 
evidence of the cost of the plaintiff's special damages was not 
disputed. 
A finding of negligence was made and a review of the Special 
Verdict form establishes that the jury concluded that the plaintiff 
had been damaged. The award for special damages must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the evidence. This Court finds that: the 
award of $3,000.00 does not bear this reasonable relationship to 
the evidence adduced at trial. The plaintiff presented evidence 
that his oast medical bills were $2,903.24 (see Exhibit 3); and an 
award of $3,000.00, while close to this amount, is greater than the 
actual past medical expenses, and not consistent with any actual 
special damages. An additur is therefore granted. The total 
special damages testified to were $22,910.24. The jury's award of 
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$3,000,00, is $19,910.24 below this. Additur is therefore granted 
in the amount of $19,910.24. This amount, when added to the 
special damage verdict of $3,000.00, equals $22,910.24, which is 
consistent with the testimony concerning specials. 
The Court now turns its attention to the general damage award. 
It is well-settled that general damages must bear a reasonable 
relationship to special damages and to the evidence. General 
damages are designed to compensate an injured plaintiff for pain 
and suffering and for damages that the plaintiff has incurred over 
and above those quantifiable damages such as lost wages and medical 
expenses. Mclntire v. Gray, 593 P.2d 1273 (Or. App. 1979). It is 
clear that special damages are more capable of definitive 
assessment than general damages. General damages are by their 
nature more subjective and difficult to pin down. This Court must 
view the general damage award in relation to the original special 
damage award and determine whether a reasonable relationship exists 
between the two. Where the original award for specials was 
$3,000.00 and the general award was $5,000.00; one cannot conclude 
that a reasonable relationship between the two does not exist. The 
question of whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to 
the evidence, must be assessed, with the case law in mind 
concerning general damages. Case law concerning general damages 
indicates that these awards are rarely susceptible of additur. 
DALTON V. HEROLD PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P. 2d 723 (Utah 1983) , the Court ruled 
that juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment 
of damages, and that where personal injuries involve a loss of 
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there 
is no set formula to compute the amount of general damages. Id. at 
726. In the case of Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, (N.M. App. 
1988) , the Court ruled that "there is no standard fixed by law for 
measuring the value of pain and suffering/ rather the amount to be 
awarded is left to the fact finder's judgment." And, in another 
case, Cartwriaht v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 593 P.2d 104 
(Okl. App. 1988) it was held that compensation for pain and 
suffering rests in the sound discretion of the jury, since there is 
no market where pain and suffering are bought and sold, nor any 
standard by which compensation can be definitely ascertained, or 
the amount actually suffered determined. 
This analysis leads this Court to conclude that generals and 
specials are sufficiently distinct from each other that specials 
may be subject to additur without modification of generals. The 
two are not synonymous nor are they inseparable. To illustrate 
this concept, the Court notes that a jury is at liberty, in some 
circumstances, to award one without the other. ' ,ne issue of 
general damages is contested, the jury may conclude that the 
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plaintiff did not actually suffer any general damages but did 
reasonably incur special damages for medical expenses or loss of 
wages. This is the case if the plaintiff's complaints are 
subjective and his credibility is questioned." Eisele v. Rood, 551 
P.2d 441 (Or. 1976). 
While this Court was not privy to the jury's deliberations or 
exact considerations in arriving at the general damage award, this 
Court can only conclude that the jury did not feel that the 
plaintiff's entitlement to general damages, i.e., his pain and 
suffering, warranted a large amount:. This Court appreciares the 
province of the jury and will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the jury in arriving at a general damage award. 
In making this ruling, this Court elects to exercise its 
supervisory power to ensure justice consistent with the jury's 
verdict. 
The defendant may accepj: this ruling, or request a new trial. 
Dated this QU #ay of September^ 1993. ^--. > ^ 
* LESLIE'tff 132WIS " 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920903329PI 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter was tried to the jury on May 17th, 18th, and 
19th, 1993, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. George T. 
Waddoups and Karen Thomas represented the plaintiff. Mark Dunn and 
Kevin Swenson represented the defendant. 
The Court directed a verdict against the defendant and 
answered question one on the verdict form. The jury found that the 
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. The jury also found the plaintiff was negligent and the 
plaintifffs negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. The jury answered question five by assessing 80% of the 
Deputy C;erk 
negligence to the defendant Brian Herold and 20% of the negligence 
to the plaintiff, Art Dalton. 
The jury awarded special damages in the amount of $3f000. 
The jury also awarded general damages in the amount of $5,000, for 
total damages in the amount of $8,000. The verdict was 
appropriately dated and signed by the jury foreperson. The Court 
having inquired of the jury as to its verdict directs the judgment 
to be entered in accordance with the verdict and its Memorandum 
Decision entered September 22, 1993, and incorporated herein by 
reference, which grants plaintiff's additur in the additional 
amount for specials of $19,910.24: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment 
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
Brian Herold, as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for special damages in the amount of 
$18,328.19 ($3,000 + $19,910.24 X 80%). 
2. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for pre-judgment interest of past special 
damages in the amount of $794.40 pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-44. This sum represents interest 
at 10% per annum on $2,400 from October 15, 1990 
through September, 1993. 
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GEORGE T. WADDOUPS #39 65 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4 252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'1! 
) POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR 
) VERIFIED COSTS AND EXPENSES 
1 Civil No. 920903329PI 
1 Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The plaintiff's motion for an award for cost 
expenses incurred in the preparation for trial of the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, August 10, 1993 at 
2:45 p.m., the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. The plaintiff 
was represented by George Waddoups. The defendant was represented 
by Mark Dunn. 
The Court having reviewed the written memoranda submitted 
by the parties, the appropriate sections of the Utah Code cited in 
plaintiff's memoranda and defendant's memorandum, and the case law 
cited therein, and having listened to oral argument presented by 
counsel, 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the following costs are 
awarded to plaintiff: 
1. Filing fee $ 120.00 
2. Travel expenses Re: 
depositions of Herold 
and Dalton 573.00 X. 
3. Court reporter fees (depo.) 
Brian Herold 258.75 
Art Dalton 169.95 
Newell Knight 188.90 X 
Dr. Warren Stadler 194.15 
Dr. Vaun Mikesell 62.50 
Dr. James Morgan 34.50 
Dr. Richard Hodnett 13.25 
4. Process server's fees, witness 
fees, and mileage 
Newell Knight (depo.) 125.00X 
Dr. Warren Stadler (depo.) 400.00* 
Dr. Warren Stadler (service) 43.00* 
Dr. Vaun Mikesell (service) 37.00X 
Dr. James Morgan (service) 35.00X 
Dr. Richard Hodnett (service) 45.00X 
Officer Mike Roberts (service) 30.00 * 
SUBTOTAL: $ 2,330.00 
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON 
SPECIAL DAMAGES (10% per 
annum on $2,400 from 
10/15/90 - 9/93): $ 794.40 
TOTAL COSTS, EXPENSES AND 
INTEREST: $ 3,124.40 
The Court denies plaintiffs motion in regard to the 
expenses and costs as to Ron Probert, an accident 
reconstructionist. However, the Court orders that Mr. Probert 
provide a detailed itemization of his fees, costs, and expenses 
incident to this litigation, and orders the defendant to pay for 
the fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Mr. Probert to testify at 
2 
the hearing which was held in-camera by this Court, The plaintiff 
is to bear the fees, costs, and expenses looen. j i i i" " .> 
Mr. Probert preparing and testifying in-camera before this Court on 
the i ssi le c )f 1 is expertise regardingyh^lmets and motorcycles. 
DATED this
 >r4"7 day of _ ?^>/L-^ 199;rl^^^-w-' o 
Approved »rm: 
BY THE 
*LX 
\ / .. 
^ ." ft' V*^"-v"**>sllj*<? V
1 COURT: •••' tfl</ • -v/V ~v 
y • ^ i / -'•••• " / ^ , \ A 
C^fc^slie A. Lewis < V ^ O O T ^ ^ ? 
Third District Court "tfo^JL^*^ 
Mark D. Dunn 
Attorney for Defendant 
4&39.ord 
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26 December 1991 
George WaddouDS, Esauire 
4252 S. 700 East 
Sal t Lake City, UT 84107 
Regarding: Marvin Dalton 
Dear Mr. WaddouDs: 
The above pa t ien t was seen by me for evaluation of TMJ-type symptoms on 
12/16/91 . He presented with a chief complaint of pain with chewing and 
popping of the jaws. 
The h i s to ry of h i s present i l l n e s s , he re la tes being in a motorcycle acc i -
dent on 10/16/90 a t which time he sustained multiple facia l injuries - p r i -
mary to the r igh t side of his face. He re la tes having fractures (blow-out 
t y p e ) . Since the accident, he r e l a t e s his bi te i s off and has noticed 
popping of the r igh t TMJ. He has been having headaches - primarily related 
to the l e f t temple region but sometimes involving the r ight temporal. The 
pain r e l a t ed to his TMJ i s primarily related to b i t i ng . Apparently, when 
chewing, he experiences pain in the pre-auricular area over the zygomatic 
arcn and into the rempie areas as well . The pain i s on the r ight side 
only. Apparently, he experiences th i s type pain on a daily basis which 
l a s t s 30 to 60 seconds. He also r e l a t e s noticing decreased opening of his 
mouth. 
On physical examination, he has a maximum inner - inc i sa l opening of 44 mm. 
with pain. The pain he experiences with man mum opening i s to the right 
p re -aur icu la r and r ight masseter regions. He has a Class I occlusion on 
the r i g h t and Class II on the l e f t . To palpation, he^is tender over the 
r i g h t TMJ and temporalis muscle. To palpation, there i s no clicking or ^ 
popping detected. There i s no crepi tus noted. Tooth #7 has been fractured, 
and i t appears only the root i s remaining. He has other carious teeth in 
h i s mouth - primarily the l e f t mandibular molar which i s decayed down to 
the r o o t s . There i s moderate periodontal disease with a fa i r amount of 
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25 December 1991 
Page II. 
Re: Marvin Dalton 
calculus around the anterior mandibular teeth. A tentative diagnosis would 
be myalgia related to the muscles of mastication. There is a working diag-
nosis of internal derangement of cha ITU en tha right: moderate periodontal 
disease; dental decay and fracture of tooth #7, 
Recommendation: 
It is my recommendation the patient have his dentition restored to a more 
nornal health. This would most likely involve good prophylaxis and instruc-
tion on oral hygiene; the removal of non-restored teeth and restoration of 
restorable teeth. After the occlusion is in a more functional, state, the patient 
should have corrected tomograms of the THJ's to assess any structural abnor-
malities, after which he should be evaluated for splint therapy. It is my 
feeling conservative treatment would be all that would be needed. Most likely! 
splint therapy would alleviate most of the myalgia and symptoms of TMJ dys-
function which he is experiencing. 
Hopefully, this will help in answering any questions you have regarding this 
patient1s TMJ function. 
Sincerely, 
*ULtJ' (j 
MICHAEL P. COSBY, D.D.S., M.D. 
jul 
